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Abstract The sexual assault of persons with mental disabilities (also described as
cognitive, intellectual and developmental disabilities) occurs at alarmingly high
rates worldwide. These assaults are a form of gender-based violence intersecting
with discrimination based on disability. Our research on the treatment of such cases
in the Canadian criminal justice system demonstrates the systemic barriers these
victims face at the level of both substantive legal doctrine and trial procedure.
Relying on feminist legal theory and disability theory, we argue in this paper that
abuses of trust and power underlie most sexual assaults of women with mental
disabilities. We argue that existing Criminal Code provisions in Canada are inad-
equate to address this type of exploitation because courts have consistently failed to
recognize that such abuses of power and trust are fundamentally inconsistent with
any notion of voluntary consent.
Keywords Sexual assault  Violence against women  Mental disability
Introduction
The sexual assaults of women with mental disabilities do not always fit neatly into
the criminal justice system’s limited idea of what a sexual assault is supposed to
look like: an articulate, active female subject making clear to the accused by words
or conduct her aversion to sexual activity. Instead, women with mental disabilities
may feel powerless to reject the sexual demands of their caregivers, or be unaware
that they can say no to someone who expects and enforces compliance in other
contexts. They may comply with demands for sexual activity without understanding
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what sexual acts are to be engaged in. They may be induced by offers of
compensation, companionship or simply social acceptance. We are not suggesting
that these factors never play a part in sexual assault of women who are not labelled
with a mental disability but rather that they are especially prevalent for these
socially marginalized complainants, who are significantly more likely to be sexually
assaulted than other women (Benedet and Grant 2012, 6; Martin et al. 2006, 829;
Brownridge 2006, 812).
Our previous work in this area has considered the role that the criminal law and
criminal trial process plays in addressing sexual violence against these women. The
role of the law and the legal system is important because the failure to provide an
effective response to such assaults has the potential to reify the status of women
with mental disabilities as targets for abuse. Our research has explored many
specific legal issues, both substantive and procedural/evidentiary, that pose
problems or concerns for women with mental disabilities who complain of sexual
assault (2007a, b, 2010, 2012, 2013a, b).
In this article, we bring these concerns together to examine them against the
broad themes that have emerged from our research. We focus in particular on the
ways, both overt and subtle, that male power and authority is deployed in this
context, and consider how to evaluate the exploitative influence of such power in a
legal framework predicated on individual consent to sexual activity. The power that
is being exercised is typically both male power in a patriarchal society but also the
power that comes from being considered mentally ‘‘typical’’ and thus not labelled as
mentally disabled, in a society that is ableist. These sources of systemic power may
be augmented by the power that comes from occupying a position of trust or
authority, formally or informally, in the lives of women with mental disabilities.
We begin this article by examining insights from feminist theory and disability
theory and what they tell us about this type of sexual violence. We then briefly
review some of the barriers faced by sexual assault complainants with mental
disabilities in the areas of consent and capacity. Our earlier work has led us to
believe that, particularly when dealing with consent and capacity, the concept of
power, or the relative lack thereof, is a key factor in much of the sexual violence
against this group of women. We move on to examine in more detail the interaction
between relationships of trust, power and authority and the formation of voluntary
consent.
While the Canadian Criminal Code has several specific provisions dealing with
such relationships, their interpretation by courts has thus far largely failed to
recognize the subtle ways in which power operates and how relationships of
inequality can be exploited. We will argue that the existing Criminal Code
provisions, and the judicial interpretation of them, reveal two significant problems.
First, where a woman does not actively resist sexual activity, courts tend to find that
consent existed and only then examine whether there was an abuse of trust, power or
authority that could negate that consent, rather than recognizing that there can be no
real consent where such an abuse exists. Second, we argue that too much
responsibility is put on the Crown, through the testimony of the complainant, to
establish that it was her vulnerability and powerlessness that led to any apparent
agreement to engage in sexual activity. We argue that it is unrealistic to expect
132 J. Benedet, I. Grant
123
someone who is the victim of an abuse of trust, power or authority to establish its
causal role on her behaviour and that, in many cases, a sufficient causal connection
should be inferred from the nature of the relationship and circumstances
surrounding the abuse of trust, power or authority.
Definitions
Before turning to these topics, some definitional clarity is required. We have chosen
to use the term ‘‘mental disability’’ in our work despite the recognition that this term
is not used as a descriptor of choice by the individuals and groups working with the
population of women whose cases we consider. There are two reasons for this. First,
we sought an umbrella term that could describe, in a shorthand way, women whose
disabilities affect cognition, perception, intellectual ability or decision-making, but
who are otherwise a heterogeneous group. The terms ‘‘developmental disability’’
and ‘‘intellectual disability’’ are more commonly used, but describe only a subset of
the women whose experiences of sexual violence are at issue in our work. In
England ‘‘learning disability’’ seems to be used interchangeably with these terms,
while in North America that label tends to refer to individuals with specific
academic challenges, such as dyslexia (McCarthy 1999). Some of the cases we
consider involve women whose mental disability is the result of a psychiatric or
mental illness, although not all mental health diagnoses would produce the kinds of
disabilities that are relevant to this project. In addition, old terms like ‘‘mental
retardation’’ still appear in the cases, as do colloquial references like ‘‘mentally
challenged’’, ‘‘mentally handicapped’’ and ‘‘special needs’’.
Second, the term mental disability seemed an apt choice because it is the term
used in s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees
the right to equality without discrimination on the basis of, among other grounds,
physical and mental disability. Our work is grounded in the conviction that the
equality rights of women with mental disabilities are violated when the criminal law
and the criminal trial process fail to adequately respond to the pervasiveness of
sexual violence against them. It is important that this equality right be given content
in the analysis by recognizing the ways that male and ableist privilege operate and
by rethinking legal concepts that were developed without regard to this group of
victims.
Our work has focused on sexual assault against women with mental disabilities.
There is no question that men with mental disabilities are also targeted for sexual
violence and our focus on women with mental disabilities is in no way meant to
diminish that reality.1 Where relevant, we have included cases that deal with male
complainants. However we believe that sexual assault against persons with
disabilities, like sexual assault generally, is highly gendered and that the intersection
of inequality based on gender and on disability justifies looking at women with
1 It has been estimated that between sixteen and thirty per cent of men with mental disabilities will have
been sexually assaulted before they reach the age of eighteen. See Roeher Institute (1992) at 25.
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mental disabilities as a group particularly vulnerable to sexual violence (Doyle
2010, 113; McCarthy and Thompson 1997).
Theoretical Insights
Disability Theory on Social Construction
Understanding the sexual assault of women with mental disabilities requires an
appreciation of the social context in which both sex and mental disability operate.
There are multiple theoretical frameworks that can contribute to this understanding.
Turning first to disability theory, social models of disability have proven
particularly influential in the context of physical disability as a framework for
resisting the conventional assumption that disabilities are inherent impairments
subject to scientific diagnosis. Social disability theorists argue that the disabilities
that people confront are often the product of unexamined barriers and discrimi-
natory attitudes, rather than any deficiency inherent to the individual, as the medical
model tends to assume (Neath 1997, 196–198).
The social construction approach to disability is useful, we believe, for
understanding certain aspects of the situation of sexual abuse of women with
mental disabilities. In particular, a social construction approach avoids the trap of
locating the particular vulnerability of women with mental disabilities to sexual
abuse in something inherent to the victims themselves. As Sherene Razack (1994,
902) has noted, this amounts to saying that people with mental disabilities are
vulnerable because they are vulnerable. Instead, we can see the social forces that
come together to make persons with mental disabilities, both male and female,
targets for sexual violence. These include the large influence that ‘‘helping
professionals’’ play in ordering and directing the lives of persons with develop-
mental disabilities in institutional and quasi-institutional settings, and the
construction of persons with mental disabilities as compliant to or acquiescent in
the demands of others.2
For example, women with mental disabilities are often reliant on others to bring
complaints of sexual abuse to the attention of authorities. This can be problematic
because the person receiving the initial complaint may not see the activity as
criminal (especially if the person committing the assault also has a mental
disability), may blame the woman for engaging in inappropriate behaviour, or may
believe that the woman will be unable to participate in or withstand a criminal
investigation (Chenoweth 1996, 401–402). All of these attitudes contribute to
underreporting and erect barriers for women seeking a response to their assaults
within the criminal justice system.
In addition, it appears that some offenders target women with mental disabilities
on the assumption that they are less likely to complain (especially if told not to) and
2 Other factors that construct the lived experience of mental disability in the context of sexual violence
include a history of inadequate education on sexuality and sexual self-determination (sometimes referred
to as the ‘‘forever child syndrome’’).
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less likely to be believed when they do complain. A recent Australian study of
police responses to sexual assault victims, for example, found that cases involving a
complainant with a psychiatric or mental health issue were least likely to result in a
charge being laid and twice as likely to be determined to be false (Murray and
Heenan 2012, 360–361). Women with psychiatric disabilities were even less likely
to be believed than women with intellectual disabilities.
The belief that mental disability is a scientific, objectively determined diagnosis
leads to certain characteristics being applied to persons with a mental disability
without any consideration of the degree to which social construction determines
those characteristics. For example, the common assertion that people with mental
disabilities are compliant may overlook the fact that this compliance is reinforced
and rewarded by support systems that provide few opportunities for dissent (Finlay
and Lyons 2002, 18). Legally, it may cause us to miss the multifaceted ways in
which people with mental disabilities resist or object to sexual assault and also to
assume that compliance represents consent rather than acquiescence in the face of
coercion or exploitative inducements (Chenoweth 1996, 404).
While the social model is important in shifting the focus away from the assumed
limitations of the individual to the larger context, it is inadequate on its own as a
theoretical framework for understanding sexual abuse of women with mental
disabilities. It is not helpful to simply treat mental disability as a label that is the
product of social attitudes, and conclude that the impairments experienced by
persons labelled mentally disabled would disappear if only the discriminatory nature
of those attitudes was acknowledged and rejected (Doyle 2010, 114).
The social model is inadequate not merely because it may minimize the reality of
impairment as a contributing element of disability, but also because it tends to
privilege individual choice as the ultimate goal of human existence. Applied
uncritically, the social model of disability endorses the idea of the liberal individual
subject who needs only to be free from external barriers to be able to make his or her
own decisions about how he or she wishes to live life.
We believe that truncating the analysis at the point of ‘‘choice’’ is deeply
problematic in the context of sexual violence against women with mental disabilities,
and can obscure the ways in which hierarchies operate along well-established axes of
oppression. As Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier note, issues of disability are ‘‘…
issues of social values, institutional priorities, and political will. They are questions
of power: of who and what gets valued, and who and what gets marginalized’’
(Devlin and Pothier 2006, 9). It is important to think not only about the ways in which
disability is socially constructed but also why those constructions take a particular
shape, particularly when they intersect with discriminatory practices on other
grounds, such as sex. For this reason, we take the view that the social model of
disability stands to be enriched by feminist theorizing around the exercise of power,
both patriarchal and ableist, especially in the context of sexual violence.
Feminist Theories of Autonomy and Male Power
Feminist theory has the potential to enlarge our understanding of how power
operates to shape choices in the context of sexual violence against women with
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mental disabilities. Feminism offers both a cogent critique of the limitations of
‘‘choice’’ and also an understanding of the ways in which male power is sexualized.
In particular, relational feminist scholars argue that our understanding of autonomy
must recognize the web of relationships of which the individual decision-maker is a
part (Ho 2008, 194).
Martha Fineman has argued that inequality should be reimagined by focusing on
vulnerability as both an inherent aspect of the human condition and a feature of
human relationships in the family and more broadly in society (Fineman 2008, 2).
Vulnerabilities are most often dynamic, changing over the human lifespan and
varying according to the particular relationship at issue. Fineman notes that the
liberal subject is usually perceived as an adult at midlife, focusing only on the least
vulnerable stage that human beings pass through in their lives, and failing to
recognize that ‘‘individuals are anchored at each end of our lives by dependency and
the absence of capacity’’ and that, for some, loss of capacity, temporary or
permanent, may also occur during the lifespan (Fineman 2008, 12). Fineman
describes this as the ‘‘persistent susceptibility to misfortune and catastrophe’’ (ibid.).
If mental disability is to be included in this analysis we prefer language that is less
pathologizing of disability, and would add the observation that incapacity is a
question of degree and no less ‘‘normal’’ when it occurs during or across a person’s
entire life than when it occurs in infancy or old age. Nonetheless, Fineman’s work
offers important insights for understanding disability beyond exceptionalism.
Feminist reassessments of autonomy may allow us to move beyond feminist
debates that have treated protection from violence and the promotion of women’s
sexual autonomy as being in tension with each other. This tension is illustrated
when feminists who seek stronger state responses to sexual violence are warned
against a paternalism that would limit women’s sexual freedom (Richardson 1996;
McCarthy 1999, 29–30; Razack 1994, 902). We find this supposed tension generally
unconvincing and believe that the circumstances of women with mental disabilities
should cause us to re-evaluate it for all women. Our research into the legal system’s
treatment of cases where women with mental disabilities complain of sexual
violence makes clear to us that these women are often denied both real sexual
autonomy and protection from violence in their lives and are not gaining one at the
expense of the other. In addition, we consider prevention of and redress for sexual
violence to be a precondition to meaningful sexual self-determination for all
women, and for women with mental disabilities in particular.
Feminist theory also offers an important understanding of the male power
exercised by those who commit acts of sexual violence. Such acts are more than the
individual decisions of abnormal men. Rape, as a relatively common practice, is
rooted in, and reinforces, sex inequality. Lisa Price has noted that sexual violence is
so common, and so normalized, that we cannot seek explanations based on what is
abnormal but rather must focus on what is shared (Price 2005, 24). Using Andrea
Dworkin’s tenets of male power (1981, quoted in ibid.), Price points out that for
male power to operate, male supremacy as a system must be accepted not only by
men but also by women (Price 2005, 27).
In our view, there are parallels to be drawn between this analysis and the power
relationships that exist in relation to mental disability, which also encourage
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acceptance by persons with mental disabilities that the inequalities they experience
are natural and beneficial. For women with mental disabilities, this power intersects
with male power in ways that may shape their expectations of what a sexual
relationship is supposed to look like.
Criminal law, by necessity, is focused on wrongs committed by individuals, not
on redressing systemic discrimination. However, the recognition that rape is a
product of a sexist culture led to calls for feminist-inspired rape laws focusing on the
actions of the perpetrator rather than on the responses of the complainant. It was
argued that such laws should consider whether the sexual activity was accompanied
by force or coercion, not whether the complainant displayed non-consent by
resisting (Clark and Lewis 1977, 163).
Speaking of the U.S. context, Catharine MacKinnon has noted that regardless of
whether rape laws are drafted to require proof of force or proof of non-consent, they
ultimately fail to account for the inequalities that define sexual assault as a practice:
Sex is relational; so is sexual assault. In unequal societies, what makes sexual
assault sexual as well as possible is the hierarchy of relation between the
parties. Rape is thus a crime of sexualized dominance on the basis of sex
(which often includes sex and age, sex and race, sex and class variously
combined and pyramided) that is legally unrecognized as such. Inequality, its
central dynamic, is flat-out ignored by the criminal law. Far from promoting
equality between women and men, the criminal law tacitly assumes that such
equality already exists. More accurately still, it shows total lack of interest in
whether it exists or not. In other words, what this crime is, the law has refused
to make criminal about it (Mackinnon 2003, 269).
This lack of attention to inequality remains a persistent failure of sexual assault laws
in Canada as well. Disability is a key locus for inequality in sexual relations that is
also not often captured by the criminal law except in rare cases where incapacity to
consent to sexual activity is proven (Kelly 2010; Rumney 2006).
The sexism of rape law intersects with other grounds of discrimination in ways
particular to those grounds. For example, racialized and Aboriginal women confront
particular stereotypes and attitudes that racialize the sexism and sexualize the
racism they experience (Demas 2009). This means, among other things, that they
are less likely to qualify as respectable victims and more likely to be seen as
consenting to the sexual activity and then falsely complaining of sexual assault after
the fact. For women with mental disabilities, particular gendered stereotypes about
mental disability contribute to their characterization as sexually deviant.
Feminist theory does provide insights into the power dynamic involved in sexual
violence against women but has been less helpful in understanding the gendered
dimension of sexual assault against women with mental disabilities. While sexual
assault against these women is a practice of sex inequality, it is also reflective of the
devaluation of persons (and especially women) with mental disabilities and these
two elements intersect in ways with which feminist critiques of sexual violence have
not always engaged. Reference is often made to the fact that women with disabilities
are particularly targeted for sexual violence but they are not always seen as
paradigmatic sexual subjects. Locating women with mental disabilities as women
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within the framework of feminist analyses is often left to disability scholars
(Chenoweth 1996, 393).
Our work has attempted to keep in the forefront the fact that women with mental
disabilities are women, subject to the same systemic violence as other women, albeit
at a higher rate because of the intersection of disability and gendered inequalities. It
is important to remember as Sherene Razack points out ‘‘disability does not cancel
out gender’’ (Razack 1994, 892) and that many of the problems faced by this group
of complainants are similar but perhaps more extreme than those faced by other
women who complain of sexual assault. Their allegations of sexual assault are
disbelieved, their expressions of consent judged inadequate and their credibility
challenged at every step of the legal process.
The Gendered Perils of Infantilization
To understand the ways in which women with mental disabilities are denied both
sexual self-determination and protection from violence, it is important to be aware
of the extent to which people with mental disabilities are infantilized and equated,
implicitly or explicitly, with children. Lawyers and judges, relying on expert
testimony, often resort to the device of ‘‘mental age’’ as a way of equating an adult
woman with a mental disability with a child.3 This occurs even where the woman
lives mostly independently in the community and where her capacity to consent to
sexual activity is not challenged. This practice is a problem for women with mental
disabilities not only because it confuses discrete academic skills (reading, writing,
mathematics) with the range of abilities and life experiences that make up a person’s
mental ability, but also because we know that, unlike for women with mental
disabilities, sexual activity with children is always abusive and harmful to the child.
One might expect that infantilization of an adult complainant would work in her
favour in that she would be seen as an ideal victim, cloaked in child-like innocence.
Leaving aside the fact that it still remains difficult to prosecute sexual assaults
involving actual child victims, infantilization does not ‘‘help’’ women with mental
disabilities because they are also stereotyped as sexually inappropriate and
indiscriminate in their sexual appetites (Benedet and Grant 2007a; Chenoweth
1996, 393–94, 405). At its core, this characterization is rooted in an equation of
people with mental disabilities not with children but with animals, acting on instinct
rather than reason.
Much of the focus of the eugenics movement was an obsession with the sexual
habits of people with disabilities, in an attempt to control those instincts and prevent
them from procreating and passing on their mental defects.4 The identification of the
‘‘mentally defective’’ was presented as a scientific endeavour, but in fact the
construction of who fell into that category was not objective. Immigrants, the poor
3 See e.g.: R v DAI, 2012 SCC 5, [2012] 1 SCR 149; R v Parrott, 2001 SCC 3, [2001] 1 SCR 178.
4 See e.g.: Buck v Bell, 274 US 200, 47 S Ct 584; Muir v Alberta (1996), 132 DLR (4th) 695, [1996] AJ
no 37 (QL), (ABQB). In some Canadian provinces, sterilization of those with mental disabilities persisted
until the 1970s. The Supreme Court of Canada rejected the practice of non-therapeutic sterilization in E
(Mrs) v Eve, [1986] 2 SCR 388, [1986] SCJ no 60 (QL).
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and Aboriginal peoples were typically assumed to be substandard specimens who
should be discouraged from reproducing and were thus much more likely to be
classified as ‘‘mentally retarded’’ (Kempton and Kahn 1991, 95–96; Grekul et al.
2004; Stote 2012). These attitudes were gendered, with women’s sexuality marked
as especially dangerous and also hereditary, such that immorality could be passed
from mother to daughter. An appropriate female sexuality was to be confined to
marriage and procreation, neither of which was authorized for these women.
The remnants of these beliefs still affect our attitudes toward the sexuality of women
with mental disabilities. For example, people may label a woman’s behaviour as
sexually inappropriate or oversexed in circumstances where similar behaviour on the
part of a non-disabled person would be considered unremarkable (Benedet and Grant
2013b, 53–54). This group of women is simultaneously labelled as asexual and
childlike, on the one hand, and hypersexual and sexually indiscriminate on the other,
stereotypes which permeate our treatment of legal issues like consent and sexual
history (Benedet and Grant 2007b). Offenders may also believe that complainants with
mental disabilities are unlikely to have sexual relationships and thus they are lucky to
get any male attention, including coerced and nonconsensual sex. Any sex, however
coercive, is construed as better than no sex (Chenoweth 1996, 405). If the offender
presents himself as a friend or boyfriend, this view may be shared by the complainant’s
family members (Chenoweth 1996, 404–405). Having a boyfriend may be seen as a
highly desired status by women who have often been systematically excluded from
typical social relationships, yet the contours of a non-exploitative intimate relationship
may be largely unfamiliar to many women with mental disabilities.
In addition, while sexual activity between adults is usually considered a matter
deserving of considerable privacy, people with mental disabilities often lead very
public lives with medical and social service personnel, family members and other
caregivers, and educators having access to all aspects of their lives. This tends to make
it seem like their sexual activity is an open book, and may mean that the rules limiting
the introduction of sexual history evidence are not invoked or applied.5 It may also lead
to applications for production of various records in the hands of third parties, most of
which the complainant will never have seen or had an opportunity to correct.6
We believe that this process of infantilization, while present for both male and
female complainants, operates differently with women as a result of the intersection
of gender and disability. It is an inherently disempowering practice, meant to
remove agency from the woman involved. But because it intersects with negative
stereotypes about women’s hypersexuality, it leads to the contradictions we see in
the case law that treat these women as simultaneously asexual and hypersexual. We
do not see the same tendency in cases about male complainants. While they may be
infantilized through the label of a mental age, this infantilization is not directly
linked to their sexuality. Male complainants are more often seen as having agency
as they try to resist the assaults of other men.7
5 Criminal Code, ss. 276–277.
6 Criminal Code, ss. 278.1–278.91.
7 See e.g.: R v Farley (1995), 23 OR (3d) 445, 99 CCC (3d) 76 (CA). Given that male complainants are
generally assaulted by men, this difference may reflect in part underlying homophobia.
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Current sexual assault law, grounded in an assessment of individual consent, is
clearly modeled on the individual autonomous subject. Unless the very low
threshold for capacity to consent to sexual activity is not met, or the competence of
the witness to testify is challenged, disability is seen as having no relevance to the
legal inquiry. However, the relevance of mental disability, intersecting with gender,
should be understood as extending well beyond the confines of incapacity or
incompetence to testify. Women with mental disabilities are subjected to a culture
of extreme imbalances of power on the basis of both sex and disability in a setting in
which they and their abuse are largely silenced. In the following section, we
examine some of the barriers faced by women with mental disabilities in the context
of our current understanding of consent and capacity to consent.
Legal Doctrines as Potential Barriers
There are a number of specific issues that arise in applying substantive sexual
assault laws and the criminal trial process to sexual assault complaints brought by
women with mental disabilities that we have developed in our work on this topic. A
brief review of some of the deficiencies in substantive doctrine is outlined here.
First, the affirmative consent standard developed in Canadian criminal law has not
always been extended to women with mental disabilities. Affirmative consent refers
to a definition of consent that is based on the subjective state of mind of the
complainant. According to R. v. Ewanchuk, where the state proves that the
complainant did not in her own mind want the sexual touching to take place, the
actus reus of the offence is proven. Where the accused knew or was reckless to the
fact that the complainant did not communicate her agreement, the mens rea is
proven.8 Thus a belief that the complainant wanted the sexual activity is not a
defence unless that belief is based on words or actions that affirmatively
communicated consent. In addition, s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code requires that
the accused have taken reasonable steps to ascertain that consent was present as a
precondition of a mistaken belief in consent defence.
A body of feminist scholarship on sexual assault has demonstrated that this
affirmative consent standard is not always applied to women complainants by courts
(Ruparelia 2006, 167; Craig 2009; Randall 2010; Gotell 2002). Our research
indicates that this is also true for women with mental disabilities as a subset of this
larger group. Some courts continue to equate inadequate resistance, compliance or
submission with consent (Benedet and Grant 2010, 2013a). This raises the concern
that some courts are assuming that women with mental disabilities are generally
consenting to sexual activity unless they demonstrate otherwise.
More fundamentally, in some cases where the complainant has a mental
disability, we question the utility of an inquiry into whether the complainant, in her
own mind, wanted the sexual touching to take place. Even if the complainant knows
she has the right not to consent to sexual touching, has turned her mind to this
question and can articulate what she was thinking at the time, the accused may be
8 [1999] 1 SCR 330 at paras 26-28 and 46-47.
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exploiting a considerable imbalance of power between himself and the complainant
on multiple grounds. We return to this problem in more detail below in considering
the exercise of authority provisions of the Criminal Code.
One way to deal with this concern within existing legal doctrines is to find that
the complainant is incapable of consenting to sexual activity. A finding of
incapacity has the advantage of not requiring that the complainant recall her state of
mind. It also could provide a route for dealing with cases in which apparent consent
is really the product of exploitation or where the complainant does not understand
the nature and consequences of sexual activity. However, the way that incapacity is
currently applied in Canada may deny to women the ability to engage in non-
coercive sexual activity without it being labelled as criminal. Capacity is treated as
an all-or-nothing assessment that would mean that all sexual activity with that
complainant would be sexual assault. As a result, Canadian courts have used
incapacity sparingly, generally only in cases where the complainant has no
awareness of the sexual activity at all.9
We have argued that this can be avoided by treating incapacity situationally, and
deciding only whether the complainant had the capacity to consent to this activity
with this person at this time (Benedet and Grant 2013a). Such an approach, which
has been endorsed by UK and some American courts,10 recognizes both that
capacity can change over time but also that consent is person and situation-specific.
Nonetheless, it is important that non-consent be considered first, and that even a
situational approach to incapacity cede to evidence that the complainant did not in
fact consent. We also argue that the capacity to say ‘‘no’’ to sexual activity requires
a lower threshold of understanding than the capacity to say ‘‘yes.’’ Even if a woman
does not understand the implications of saying yes to sexual activity, it is quite
possible that she knows that she does not want it to take place.
While these problems play out in ways specific to the intersection of gender and
disability, we are skeptical of the value of ‘‘special’’ sexual offences that apply only
to complainants with disabilities. In our view, it is much better to focus on how the
general provisions on sexual assault and the criminal trial process can be applied
equally to women with mental disabilities. If our general sexual assault law does not
adequately protect this group of highly targeted women, it needs to be rethought.
Whatever legal doctrine is at issue—consent, capacity, etc., we believe that
exploitation of power over complainants with mental disabilities permeates these
cases and that the law’s attempt to address these abuses must be subject to careful
scrutiny. In the next section of this article, we consider the consent provisions of the
Canadian Criminal Code and look specifically to the circumstances in which a
relationship of trust, power or authority between the accused and the complainant
can negate consent.
9 See e.g.: R v WL (1994), 123 Nfld & PEIR 357, 382 APR 357 (Nfld Prov Ct (Youth Ct)) where the court
assumed that the complainant, a 59-year-old woman in the advanced stages of Alzheimer’s disease, was
incapable of consenting.
10 R v C [2009] UKHL 42, [2009] 1 WLR 1786; People v Thompson, 142 Cal App 4th 1426, 48 Cal Rptr
3d 803 (2006).
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The Role of Relationships of Trust, Power and Authority
We believe that many of the problems relating to our understanding of consent and
lack of consent for women with mental disabilities relate to our failure to recognize
the abuses of trust, power and authority that permeate the lives of many women with
mental disabilities. While it might be argued that all women lack power in the
context of sexual violence and sexual assault trials, the problems are magnified for
this group of women because of their intersecting vulnerabilities. When seeking to
identify sexual assaults that are suitable for the purposes of criminal prosecution we
look for paradigmatic sexual assaults where the complainant clearly says no,
preferably with active resistance, but the accused persists with sexual activity
nonetheless. Most of the analytical work is focused on the question of consent as we
have come to understand that doctrine, assuming that a clear line can be drawn
between cases where a woman ‘‘voluntarily agreed’’ to sexual activity and those
where she did not. As Razack points out, viewing sexual assault through the lens of
consent and force makes it difficult ‘‘to examine the norms against which we
measure what is coercive’’ (Razack 1994, 895).
This focus on consent may not get at the picture of sexual assault for women with
mental disabilities. The complainant may be in an institution and may be coerced by
a caregiver against whom she feels powerless to say no, even if she understands that
she is entitled to say no. She may be lured into sexual activity through the promise
of small rewards or an opportunity to engage in some activity in which she would
otherwise be denied participation.11 Or she may have learned through experience
that acquiescence to sexual activity is the price of social inclusion and desired
‘‘friendships’’ from which she is often excluded.12 Once a case gets past the
threshold of charges being laid, we look for the ideal victim (Randall 2010, 397)
whose sexual history does not taint her credibility and who can clearly remember
and articulate all the details of her victimization without hesitation on the witness
stand even under a gruelling cross-examination (Benedet and Grant 2012).
As Lesley Chenoweth has pointed out, our overprotection of women with
disabilities has also made them more vulnerable targets of sexual violence:
In both structured and implicit ways, the experiences of violence for women
with disabilities have been neither voiced nor heard. The ways in which this
has happened are extremely complex but rest on the control and oppression of
such women into places in our society where they may not be known by
persons other than human service staff members. They may have all aspects of
their lives controlled by others, and they may miss out on experiences of
ordinary relationships – good and bad. There are inherent social practices
shaping and silencing these experiences. These practices are paradoxical in
that they actually increase vulnerability rather than protect women (Cheno-
weth 1996, 403).
11 See e.g.: R v KET, [1990] OJ no 2674 (QL) (Dist Ct).
12 R v BM, [1994] OJ no 2242 (Prov Div) (QL).
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This ‘‘containment of women with disabilities as eternal children’’ (Chenoweth
1996, 404) may make them targets for exploitative male violence.
A large number of sexual assaults against women with mental disabilities are
committed by ‘‘caregivers’’, broadly understood to include those who provide
services and assistance to persons with disabilities. Most of these people occupy
positions of trust or authority toward the women they assault. These might include,
for example, group home workers, adapted bus drivers, or health care workers.13
Some men in caregiving roles use the power they have to exploit women with
mental disabilities who they see as easy targets for sexual abuse—unlikely to
complain and unlikely to be believed where complaints are made. The criminal
justice system then furthers the exploitation by failing to take seriously complaints
of sexual assault that are made or by failing to accommodate the needs of this group
of complainants within the trial process so that their complaints of sexual violence
can be addressed.
The power imbalance is magnified exponentially for women with mental
disabilities who live in institutions and are dependent on caregivers for every
aspect of their daily lives (Chenoweth 1995, 41). This power reinforces
compliance and makes it even more difficult for women to speak out when
they have been abused (Crossmaker 1991, 208). There may also be a culture of
silence within the institution that protects employees and other patients from
the detection of sexual violence or its reporting to authorities (Chenoweth
1995, 41).
In Canada, s. 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code does acknowledge that no consent
to sexual activity is obtained where ‘‘the accused induces the complainant to engage
in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority’’. In R v Lutoslawski
the Ontario Court of Appeal describes this section as addressing:
… the kinds of relationships in which an apparent consent to sexual activity is
rendered illusory by the dynamics of the relationship between the accused and
the complainant, and by the misuse of the influence vested in the accused by
virtue of that relationship. … An individual who is in a position of trust over
another may use the personal feelings and confidence engendered by that
relationship to secure an apparent consent to sexual activity.14
Our examination of the case law under s. 273.1(2)(c) leads us to conclude that courts
are giving an overly rigid interpretation to this section for all complainants, but
particularly for complainants with mental disabilities, and, as such, it has not been
an effective tool with which to address abuses of trust, power and authority.
We examined all of the cases in which s. 273.1(2)(c) was considered with
complainants above the age of consent. We found a total of 54 cases and in 14 of
13 See e.g.: R v Hundle, 2002 ABQB 1084, 10 CR (6th) 37, and 2003 ABQB 618 and R v Kiared, 2008
ABQB 767, [2008] AJ no 1459 (QL) [Kiared], both involved accuseds who worked for transportation
services for dependent and disabled adults; R v Ashley-Pryce, 2004 BCCA 531, [2004] BCJ no 2093 (QL)
and R v Brown, 2013 ONCJ 203, [2013] OJ no 1791 (QL) both involved sexual assaults on elderly women
in care homes where the offenders worked.
14 2010 ONCA 207, [2010] OJ no 1094 (QL) at para 12 [Lutoslawski].
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those cases the section was invoked successfully to vitiate consent.15 A large
percentage of the cases where the use of s. 273.1(2)(c) was successful involved
teenage complainants where there were multiple charges, including the offence of
sexual exploitation of a young person (s. 153), which does not require proof of non-
consent, as well as sexual assault.16
Only four of the 54 cases applying s. 273.1(2)(c) involved complainants with
mental disabilities and in only two of those cases was consent ultimately found to be
vitiated on the basis of an abuse of trust, power or authority. Both of these cases
involved young women and neither case analyzed the section in any detail. In R v
Bergen, an 18-year-old complainant was a patient in a mental health unit and the
accused was a 50-year-old licensed social worker working in the unit. In R v
Mianskum the complainant was 17 years old with a history of mental health issues
and suicide attempts. She attended the home of the accused for the purposes of
native healing for a medical problem during which he sexually assaulted her. In both
of the successful cases, a clear therapeutic role was combined with a young
complainant and a significantly older accused. We found no cases involving a
complainant with a mental disability who was over 18 years of age where the
argument of trust, power or authority negating consent was ultimately successful
although, as discussed below, in one of the unsuccessful cases a new trial was
ordered.
The unsuccessful s. 273.1(2)(c) cases reveal the problems in applying the section
as it is currently construed. In one of these cases, R v T(D) the accused was
convicted at trial but this decision was reversed on a summary conviction appeal.17
The accused was a ‘‘favourite uncle’’ of the complainant who would visit her when
no one else was home. The 32-year-old complainant had various physical and
developmental disabilities. The accused engaged in sexual activity with her over a
number of years despite her requests for him to stop and to go away. The
complainant communicated through gestures and sounds, and testified with the
assistance of an interpreter. Because there was some ambiguity in the complainant’s
testimony around one incident, the trial judge had a reasonable doubt as to consent
despite his conclusion that the complainant probably did not understand the nature
of the sexual activity involved. However, the trial judge went on to find that consent
was vitiated by an abuse of trust and authority on the part of the accused. The judge
relied on, among other things, the complainant’s low intellectual age, the accused’s
15 R v Wood, [2012] OJ no 3370 (QL) (SC); R v Howell, 2012 ONSC 846; R v Bergen, 2011 ONCA 210;
R v FL, 2009 ONCA 813, [2009] OJ no 4839 (QL); R v Lawrence, [2008] OJ no 1341 (QL) (SC); R v
Borkowsky, 2006 MBQB 109, aff’d 2008 MBCA 2; R v Roberds, 2006 BCCA 415; R v Makayak, 2004
NUCJ 5, [2004] NuJ no 3 (QL) [Makayak]; R v LRL, 2000 NSCA 94; R v Mianskum, [2000] OJ no 5802
(QL) (SC),aff’d [2002] OJ no 3955 (QL) (CA); R v DM, 136 CCC (3d) 412 (Ont CA); R v Fast (1996),
113 Man R (2d) 52 (CA); R v Audet, [1996] 2 SCR 171; R v TR, [1996] OJ no 4945 (QL) (Ct J (Gen Div)).
16 See e.g Lutoslawski, supra n 12; R v RM, [2004] OJ no 5869 (QL) aff’d 2007 ONCA 872, [2007] OJ
no 4856 (QL) (conviction under s. 153); R v LVR, 2011 BCSC 1152, [2011] BCJ no 1620 (QL); R v JC,
[2000] OJ no 5805 (QL) (SC) (conviction under s. 151); R v Morasse, 2012 QCCQ 363, [2012] QJ no 366
(QL) (convictions under ss. 151 and 152).
17 2011 ONCJ 213, [2011] OJ no 1874 (QL) [DT, trial judgment], appeal allowed 2012 ONSC 2166,
[2012] OJ no 1720 (QL) [DT, appeal judgment].
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superior physical, intellectual and social skills, his role as her favourite uncle and
the degree to which he dominated and preyed on the complainant’s vulnerability
and insisted she keep their relationship ‘‘secret,’’ as a sexual predator would do. The
trial judge concluded that the evidence showed:
… [T]he accused exploited an overwhelming inequality to his own advantage,
abused a position of trust and authority to influence and manipulate the
complainant, thereby vitiating any consent the complainant may have given. It
is abundantly clear that there was such a disparity in the relative situations of
the parties that the weaker party (the complainant) was unable to choose
freely.18
This decision was overturned on appeal. The appeal court applied a rigorous
standard for s. 273.1(2)(c) concluding that the Crown must prove both the existence
of the relationship of trust, power or authority and ‘‘that the complainant’s free will
was effectively overborne by the impact and abuse of that position’’.19 This
approach misses the subtle nature of abuses of trust, which may develop over time
and are unlikely to involve explicit threats of violence or harm if consent is not
forthcoming. (Grant 2012) As the Court noted in Lutoslawski, the accused may use
‘‘personal feelings and confidence engendered by that relationship to secure an
apparent consent to sexual activity’’.20
The appeal court held there was no evidence that the accused was in a position of
authority over the complainant. In his consideration of the relationship of trust, the
appeal judge quoted extensively from a case involving a young person and indicated
that it would be very difficult to conceive of a trust relationship between two adults
unless the accused was in a professional or employment capacity. He went on to find
that the Crown had failed to prove that an abuse of the position of trust induced
consent on the part of the complainant. Because the case had been prosecuted on the
basis that the complainant did not consent, there was an absence of evidence that she
consented because of an abuse of trust. In other words, where the complainant
asserts non-consent, it is going to be very difficult for the Crown to argue in the
alternative that consent was vitiated by an abuse of trust. The approach of the appeal
court in DT requires the complainant to concede that she agreed to sexual activity
even where in her mind she did not.
In the final case in which s. 273.1(2)(c) was considered in the context of mental
disability, R v Alsadi, the allegation of a breach of trust, power or authority was
rejected at trial.21 While the Court of Appeal found errors in the trial judge’s
assessment, it declined to enter a conviction and instead sent the case back for a
retrial.22 The complainant, who was involuntarily committed in a psychiatric ward,
engaged in oral sex with a uniformed security guard in the hospital while she was
18 DT, trial judgment, ibid at para 48.
19 DT, appeal judgment, supra n 15 at para 25.
20 Lutoslawski, supra n 12 at para 12.
21 (27 July 2011), Vancouver 213734-2-C (QL) at para 52 (PC) [Alsadi, trial judgment].
22 2012 BCCA 183, [2012] BCJ no 826 (QL) [Alsadi, appeal judgment]. A bench warrant has been issued
for the accused but, as of the time of writing, he has not been apprehended.
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off the ward having a cigarette. As in DT, the complainant testified vehemently that
she did not consent to sexual activity and, as in DT, she was disbelieved. Instead she
was portrayed as hypersexual and as the initiator of all sexual activity. She was
depicted as a woman who would never say no to sex and the accused was painted as
the victim of her aggression.
In deciding that the security guard was not in a position of authority over the
complainant, the trial judge made a number of troubling findings. He held that
accused was just conducting a routine patrol of the hospital grounds at the time of
the sexual activity and thus would not have had the authority to restrain the
complainant at that particular time, even though on other occasions security guards
are involved in the restraint of patients.23 He focused on the fact that the
complainant was older than the accused and thus there was no imbalance of power
due to their age differences and that, because the whole incident lasted less than
15 min, it was ‘‘improbable for any sort of trust, authority or relationship of
dependency to be developed between the parties’’.24 The fact that the complainant
was detained in the hospital involuntarily is not mentioned in the trial decision, nor
is there any consideration of whether she was medicated (forcibly or otherwise) at
the time of the alleged assault. The judge gave a narrow interpretation to s.
273.1(2)(c), stating that it only applies where the complainant’s free will is
overridden, or where she fears reprisal if she refuses sexual activity, or does not
understand she is allowed to say no.
The Court of Appeal did find errors in the trial judge’s analysis and rejected
virtually all of the factors the trial judge considered in denying the accused’s
authority over the complainant. The Court held that the trial judge should have
focused on whether the accused abused a position of trust, power or authority to
induce consent rather than on whether the complainant misapprehended her right to
refuse his advances. The Court of Appeal shifted the focus back to the causal impact
of any authority relationship, noting that the issue was why the complainant entered
the sexual relationship. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial on the basis that it
had not been determined whether the complainant participated in sexual activity
because of Alsadi’s abuse of the position of authority.
In both of these cases, the complainants claimed that they did not consent. As a
result, the Crown did not frame the facts in terms of apparent but vitiated consent.
The case law outside of the context of disability also demonstrates that a
complainant who appears to ‘‘willingly participate’’ in sexual activity will have a
difficult time invoking s. 273.1(2)(c) even though the section was enacted to
respond to exactly this situation. For example, in the recent decision of R v DJD,25
the accused was a religious pastor who was charged with sexually assaulting two
young women who lived with his family, one in 2000, the other in 2006. The
accused met both complainants in his capacity as pastor when each woman was a
teenager and in need of counseling or support.
23 The complainant had been hospitalized 20 times in the past and it is likely she had witnessed security
guards restraining patients.
24 Alsadi, trial judgment, supra n 19 at para 54.
25 2012 SKQB 519, [2012] SJ no 797 (QL).
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The first complainant moved in with the accused when her mother and new
stepfather told her she could not live with them. The relationship progressed from
hugging to extensive sexual touching. It continued even after she was married and
had children. The second complainant had had a difficult childhood, having been
placed in foster care at the age of six. Both her parents were dead and she began
living with the accused after spending a year in college. She met him at a friend’s
memorial service when she was 17 years old and sitting in the lobby of the church
crying. He brought her into his office to counsel her. After she moved in with his
family, the accused introduced her to people as his adopted daughter. The sexual
relationship evolved in the same way as with the first complainant. With both
women, he told them they were free to say no and that if they were unsure they
should pray about whether to continue their sexual relationship with him.
The trial judge characterized each complainant as a ‘‘willing participant’’ in the
sexual activity.26 This conclusion permeated the rest of the judgment, which
repeatedly referred to the fact that they consented and that the accused believed in that
consent. In fact, consent was the very question at issue under s. 273.1(2)(c). The trial
judge concluded that the accused was not in a position of trust over either complainant
in large part because the complainants knew they could say no and did not.
As with DT and Alsadi, these women were expected to recognize the nature of
the exploitation when they were caught in the midst of it. The initial finding of
consent leads to a conclusion that there was no violation of trust, power or authority
when s. 273.1(2)(c) is intended precisely for cases where a complainant has
apparently agreed to engage in sexual activity. The section is meant to provide the
tools to look behind any apparent agreement and to unpack the unequal and
exploitative relationships that may have led to the agreement.
These cases demonstrate an impoverished understanding of the nature of abuse of
trust for women with mental disabilities and a failure to recognize the relationship
between those abuses and consent. We see two central problems with the courts’
analyses. First, a significant part of the problem stems from the two-step approach to
consent that is applied in these cases. The question is asked in the abstract ‘‘did the
complainant consent’’ and it is only after the finding of consent is made that the court
moves on to consider the relationship of trust, power or authority. The appeal court
judge in DT, for example, held that it was only necessary to consider s. 273.1(2)(c) ‘‘if
the trial judge has decided there was true consent or has a reasonable doubt as to true
consent after all considerations mentioned above’’.27 The trial judge in Alsadi found
consent and then examined trust, power and authority, an approach that was implicitly
approved by the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal referred to the complainant as
a ‘‘willing participant’’ aside from the violation of trust, power or authority, and went
on to quote a passage saying that sexual activity in the context of a relationship of
trust is criminalized notwithstanding the fact that the complainant consented.28
26 Ibid at paras 53, 63.
27 DT, appeal judgment, supra n 15 at para 22.
28 Alsadi, appeal judgment, supra n 20 at para 29, citing R v PS (1993), WCB (2d) 256, [1993] OJ no
70419 (QL) (Ct J (Gen Div)), aff’d [1994] OJ no 3775 (QL) (CA) and R v L(DB) (1995), 25 OR (3d) 649,
101 CCC (3d) 406 (CA).
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We reject the idea that a court can declare the existence of consent in fact and
only then negate it through a violation of trust, power or authority. True consent can
only be established by looking at the full context of the trust, power or authority
relationship and assessing the impact of that relationship. The focus should be on
whether the Crown has established the complainant did not consent either because
she did not want the sexual activity to take place or because, although the sexual
activity was not unwanted at the time, it was the product of an abuse of trust, power
or authority. The complainant should not have to choose between these different
conceptions of non-consent. Furthermore, a two-step approach biases the outcome
on the power, trust or authority determination. If it has already been decided that the
complainant consented in the abstract, apart from the context of the relationship,
then it is less likely that it will be concluded that she only consented because of an
abuse of trust, power or authority.
Courts tend to forget in these cases that the law requires that the complainant
have communicated her consent to the accused and that there is no doctrine of
implied consent in Canadian law. Lack of resistance or passivity is not consent. In
other words, the doctrine of affirmative consent is not applied rigorously in these
cases. We are left with the impression that judges are reluctant to convict in
circumstances where the accused is faced with an apparently willing complainant
and that it almost seems unreasonable for the accused to be expected to be aware of
the imbalance of power between himself and the complainant, and to refrain from
proceeding.
The second problem stems from the wording of the legislation itself and the
requirement that the Crown prove that it was the abuse of trust, power or authority
which induced agreement to engage in sexual activity. There is not a lot of case law
on what the ‘‘inducement’’ element adds to s. 273.1(2)(c). In Makayak, a case
involving a prison guard who sexually assaulted a woman he was guarding in a jail
cell, the judge suggests that the word inducement ‘‘introduces a more subtle form of
pressure that can be inferred from the circumstances of the exercise of the power or
authority’’.29 The trial judge did not set out what this requires other than to cite
evidence showing that the accused was aware that he should not be having sexual
contact with the complainant.
Imposing a requirement that the Crown prove that the abuse of trust caused the
complainant’s agreement is problematic. It is difficult for a complainant in these
situations to be able to articulate why she submitted to the accused’s sexual
advances. It is unrealistic to expect her to be able to fully understand and articulate
the nature of the trust relationship and how the accused exploited her vulnerability
as a result of that trust relationship. Differing levels of intellectual ability may make
it particularly difficult to communicate these subtle factors on the witness stand.
The word ‘‘induces’’ should be interpreted in such a way that it captures the
subtle and insidious nature of the violations of trust, power and authority that are
involved in these cases. As was recognized in Makayak inducement can often be
inferred from the exercise of power in question. In particular kinds of relationships,
for example, the nature of the relationship and the abuse of trust inherent in any
29 Makayak, supra n 13 at para 70.
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form of sexual activity within that relationship may make it difficult to imagine how
a woman could ever give meaningful consent in the circumstances. This is
particularly true in institutional settings, where the accused is an employee of the
institution, and where the imbalance of power between the parties is so significant
that the notion of voluntary consent seems virtually impossible.
While Canada has not adopted an approach based on the type of relationship per
se, the courts are free to consider the nature of the relationship as a relevant factor in
determining whether the inducement requirement has been met. In other words, it
should be relatively simple for the Crown to satisfy this element in contexts that are
inherently exploitative, such as in the context of an institutional caregiver and
institutionalized complainant. Inducement can be inferred from the nature of the
relationship and the imbalance of power between the complainant and the accused,
absent some other unusual evidence tending to suggest that the relationship was not
a factor. In our view, Alsadi illustrates a scenario where the inducement requirement
should not have been a barrier to conviction. The complainant was an involuntarily
committed psychiatric patient and the accused an on-duty employee of the hospital
with authority over patient security.
Many American state penal codes set out specific relationships in which sexual
activity is prohibited and criminalize sex within those relationships (Lentz and
Chaires 2011). Some states, for example, prohibit sexual activity between someone
who is civilly committed in a psychiatric facility and an employee of the facility
(Ibid table 3 at 42). There are some advantages to this approach as it provides clarity
in situations like Alsadi where sexual activity is prohibited because of the imbalance
of power inherent in the relationship itself. As with age of consent rules, the other
party is on notice that sexual activity in this context is prohibited.
There are also disadvantages to a blunt relationship-based approach. It may fail to
take into account intersecting vulnerabilities that heighten power imbalances in
unexpected contexts (Ibid 36–37). A relationship approach may also shift the focus
away from the nature of the exploitation to the formal characteristics of the
relationship. Thus the assumption may be that relationships not listed are not
exploitative and that no imbalance of power exists.
In our view, some relationships are so inherently exploitative, or reveal such an
imbalance of power, that courts should be able to infer the inducement from the
existence of sexual activity within that particular relationship. This is not to read a
strict relationship approach into s. 273.1(2)(c) but rather to suggest that courts
should focus on the presence of exploitation and not on whether the complainant
recognized that exploitation. In our view, the wording of the Criminal Code does not
preclude a conclusion that some relationships—such as an institutional caregiver
and a resident—involve such an imbalance of power that the practical burden will
shift to the defence to demonstrate that agreement was not induced through the
abuse of trust, power or authority.
Courts should also look to evidence of the hallmarks of exploitation in the
relationship to infer inducement. For example, signs that the accused groomed the
complainant for sexual activity or that he warned her to keep the relationship a
secret are both clear signs of exploitation. The offering of rewards, or false promises
of social inclusion, are also hallmarks of exploitation.
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A relationship of trust will not always lead to the conclusion that sex was
exploitative. For example, a spouse or boyfriend may also be a caregiver to a person
with a disability and this caregiving role does not necessarily make sex exploitative.
Nor is this to suggest that a woman with a mental disability can never engage in a
casual sexual encounter without that sexual activity constituting sexual assault.
Rather, we are suggesting that where that casual partner is in a role of trust, power
or authority over her, and she complains of sexual assault, the unequal nature of the
relationship must lead to a high level of scrutiny.
To the contrary, judges tend to see trust, power or authority relationships as being
premised on age, and are most willing to apply the section where the complainant is
a teenager, although, as DJD reveals, its success is not inevitable even then. The
provision is not necessary in many of these cases because charges under s. 153,
sexual exploitation of a young person, do not require proof of inducement once the
necessary dependency or trust/authority relationship has been established. Courts
are very reluctant to find relationships of trust or authority with adult women except
in extreme cases such as psychologist/patient30 or prison guard/prisoner.31 We find
this somewhat ironic in the context of complainants with mental disabilities given
the courts’ general willingness to infantilize adult women with mental disabilities.
That infantilization does not work to their benefit when non-consent is being
considered.
The Offence of ‘‘Sexual Exploitation of a Person with a Disability’’
The paucity of case law dealing with mental disability under s. 273.1(2)(c) led us to
wonder whether cases involving complainants with mental disabilities were instead
being prosecuted under s. 153.1—the offence of ‘‘sexual exploitation of a person
with a disability’’. The section was added to the Criminal Code in 1998.32 It requires
proof that the accused is in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant
with a disability and yet that finding does not negate consent. Rather the Crown
must prove the additional element of non-consent, apparently on the same standard
as for sexual assault generally. Thus this offence will always include all the
elements of sexual assault plus additional requirements related to the exploitation of
a trust relationship. Yet the maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment for sexual
exploitation of a person with a disability is lower than the maximum 10 years
imprisonment for the lowest form of sexual assault, a fact that flies in the face of the
idea that the exploitation of a particularly vulnerable complainant should be an
aggravating factor rather than a mitigating one.
We found only 15 cases under s. 153.1. Convictions were obtained in
approximately one third of these cases although it was sometimes difficult to
determine the ultimate outcome because some of the reported decisions were
30 R v Matheson (1999), 44 OR (3d) 557, 134 CCC (3d) 289 (CA).
31 Makayak, supra n 13.
32 Bill S-5, An Act to Amend the Canada Evidence Act, The Criminal Code, and the Canadian Human
Rights Act, 1st Sess, 36th Parl, 1998 (as passed by the House of Commons 30 April 1998).
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interim motions on other issues. Often when the section is charged, it is in addition
to sexual assault charges and if convictions are appropriate under both sections, it is
likely that charges under s. 153.1 will be stayed and only the more ‘‘serious’’ sexual
assault conviction entered. Section 153.1 does not appear to be filling the gap left by
the weaknesses of s. 273.1(2)(c).
As with s. 273.1(2)(c), the trust component of s. 153.1 can be problematic. Trust
relationships can arise in nontraditional ways in the context of disability. For
example, in R v Kiared,33 the accused was a driver for a company that provided
transportation services for persons with disabilities, a service on which many
persons with disabilities depend for access to the community. Three days after
driving the complainant, he appeared at her condo in uniform, where he sexually
assaulted her. He was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm but was
acquitted under s. 153.1. The Court was not persuaded that there was a sufficient
relationship of trust, despite recognizing that the accused met the complainant,
learned of her address and gained access to information about her disability through
his role as a driver. The trial judge acknowledged the age difference between the
two, the immaturity of the complainant, her expectation of safety in her home and
his exploitation of her vulnerability. While he conceded that a DATS driver could
be in a position of trust, he declined to find one in this case because the assault took
place outside of the driver/passenger relationship and was only a single encounter.
The incoherence of s. 153.1 is demonstrated by the fact that it has its own abuse
of trust, power and authority provision analogous to s. 273.1(2)(c),34 which can be
applied to negate consent in the context of a s. 153.1 prosecution. Thus the Crown
would have to prove a relationship of trust or authority to get into s. 153.1 and then
go on and show an abuse of a position of trust, power or authority in order to negate
the consent requirement of s. 153.1. Not surprisingly, we have found no cases where
this latter provision was applied to vitiate consent.
In our view, s. 153.1 should be repealed. The section adds nothing in the way of
deterrence or denunciation for the sexual exploitation of people with mental
disabilities by persons in positions of trust or authority. Rather it sets this group of
complainants apart from other victims of sexual assault, requiring proof of
additional elements to obtain a conviction, and then provides a sentencing discount
for those convicted. It is difficult to conceive of any fact situation where a
conviction could be obtained under s. 153.1 but not under the general sexual assault
provision, whereas there are cases such as Kiared where sexual assault charges are
successful but the sexual exploitation count cannot be made out. These cases should
be dealt with as sexual assaults and the violation of relationships of trust dealt with
through an expanded interpretation of s. 273.1(2)(c), which focuses on the
exploitative behaviour of the accused, rather than on the impact of that behaviour on
the complainant.
33 Kiared, supra n 11.
34 The wording of the section is slightly different than s. 273.1(2)(c) in that s. 153.1(3)(c) requires the
Crown to prove the complainant was counseled or incited to engage in the sexual activity, not ‘‘induced.’’
None of the cases considering both sections addressed this difference.
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Conclusion
Canada has made significant gains over the past two decades in recognizing that an
absence of consent to sexual contact is not invariably accompanied by physical
resistance, and that non-consent is to be measured by whether the complainant wanted
the sexual activity to take place. Section 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal Code was intended
to recognize that power and inequality must be scrutinized in assessing non-consent.
However, the courts have interpreted this section so narrowly that it would appear the
only hierarchy recognized is that of age, which is already taken into account explicitly
through a range of offences applying to young victims. Our courts must do a better job of
understanding how adult relationships of trust and power operate to secure acquiescence
in sexual activity and thus negate consent. This shortcoming is particularly problematic
for women with mental disabilities who often find themselves in dependent living
situations and heavily reliant on social services for access to the community.
The tendency to infantilize persons with mental disabilities by consigning them
to the status of eternal children may spring from a well-meaning protective impulse.
Unfortunately, it also may make them particularly ill-equipped to recognize when
they are being targeted for abuse. In the criminal justice system, infantilization is a
source of disempowerment and discrimination rather than a mechanism of
protection. Classifying women with mental disabilities according to their IQ or
mental age tends to undermine their credibility, rather than according to them the
special protections otherwise reserved for children.
Women with mental disabilities experience inequality in ways that intersect forms of
ableist privilege with male power. They are rewarded socially for passing as ‘‘normal’’
which, for women, means being an object of male sexual interest. Yet they are also
considered hypersexual and sexually deviant whenever they engage in sexual activity.
Too often, the assumption is that they wanted it and are lucky to get it. This makes it
extremely difficult to prove non-consent, especially in situations where the coercion
resides in the inequalities of the relationship rather than overt pressures by the accused.
The ideal victim of sexual assault is a fiction. No woman can meet this
impossible standard, whose requirements seem only to increase in number in
response to reforms designed to make cases easier to prosecute and provide justice
for greater numbers of women. By definition, women with mental disabilities cannot
even aspire to be ideal victims because of sexist and ableist constructions of
victimhood. Canadian sexual assault law fails to grasp these inequalities that
preclude voluntary consent and thus fails to deploy provisions designed to address
the effects of relationships of power, trust, authority and dependency.
The current legislative regime and the accompanying judicial response in Canada
fail to respond to the barriers faced by sexual assault complainants with mental
disabilities. Some other jurisdictions have examined pieces of this problem. For
example, the Law Reform Commission of Ireland has recently released an important
report on sexual offences and the capacity to consent.35 This report recommends
35 Ireland Law Reform Commission (2011) Sexual offences and capacity to consent. Dublin: Law
Reform Commission. [Sexual offences and capacity to consent]. The focus of this report is on persons
with intellectual disabilities but much of its analysis would have broader application; see also Edwards
et al. (2012).
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that reforms be carried out with the dual goals of continuing ‘‘the protective
function of the criminal law in this area for adults who do not have the capacity to
consent while ensuring that persons with limited decision-making ability are not
unfairly precluded from relationships of a sexual nature where they have the
requisite understanding of what a sexual relationship entails’’.36 It is time for
Canada to address in a comprehensive manner what steps can be taken both to
reduce the incidence of sexual violence against women with mental disabilities and
to ensure that the criminal justice system responds fully to their complaints of
sexual assault.
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